Peer-reviewed publications:
Durán-Cabré, J.M., Esteller-Moré, A. and L. Salvadori (2015): “EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HORIZONTAL COMPETITION IN TAX ENFORCEMENT”, International Tax and Public Finance, October 2015, Volume 22, Issue 5, pp 834-860. (DO: 10.1007/s10797-014-9333-0).
ABSTRACT: Tax auditing parameters have been largely overlooked by the literature as policy-making instruments of any relevance; however, enforcement strategies are critical elements of the tax burden. In this paper we show that, in a federal framework, tax auditing policies can serve as additional tools for regional interaction. We examine the presence of this interaction by adopting a spatial econometric approach. We employ a spatial panel autoregressive model and obtain results that are congruent with standard theory, corroborating the presence of horizontal competition between regions in their tax auditing policies. We also find that once regional governments acquire legal power, the opaque competition in enforcement policies appears to switch in part to a more transparent competition in statutory tax parameters.
Durán-Cabré, J.M., Esteller-Moré, A. and L. Salvadori (2016): “EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON TAX COOPERATION AMONG SUB-CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIONS”, Journal of Tax Administration, 2, 2, 24-46.
ABSTRACT: The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralized context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralized tax administration, as in the medium-long run the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved.
Working Papers:
Salvadori, L. (2015): “DOES TAX ENFORCEMENT COUNTERACT THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TERRORISM? A CASE STUDY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY”, Working Papers of the IEB 2015/09.
This paper was awarded the Epainos Prize for Young Regional Scientist at the ERSA 2015 Congress. Media coverage: [1] & [2].
ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the impact of terrorism on tax enforcement policies by focusing on the case of the Basque Country. The presence of externalities in tax administration attributable to the costs of terrorism is investigated by undertaking a theoretical analysis. The findings of this are tested using Spanish data extracted from repeated surveys and other sources. By employing ordered response models, evidence is found of the negative impact of terrorism on tax enforcement as it is perceived by residents in the Basque Country and Navarre. In particular, this impact is found to be stronger for entrepreneurs and liberal professionals. No significant impact is found for individuals resident in the rest of Spain.
Durán-Cabré, J.M., Esteller-Moré, A. and L. Salvadori (2015): “EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HORIZONTAL COMPETITION IN TAX ENFORCEMENT”, International Tax and Public Finance, October 2015, Volume 22, Issue 5, pp 834-860. (DO: 10.1007/s10797-014-9333-0).
ABSTRACT: Tax auditing parameters have been largely overlooked by the literature as policy-making instruments of any relevance; however, enforcement strategies are critical elements of the tax burden. In this paper we show that, in a federal framework, tax auditing policies can serve as additional tools for regional interaction. We examine the presence of this interaction by adopting a spatial econometric approach. We employ a spatial panel autoregressive model and obtain results that are congruent with standard theory, corroborating the presence of horizontal competition between regions in their tax auditing policies. We also find that once regional governments acquire legal power, the opaque competition in enforcement policies appears to switch in part to a more transparent competition in statutory tax parameters.
Durán-Cabré, J.M., Esteller-Moré, A. and L. Salvadori (2016): “EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON TAX COOPERATION AMONG SUB-CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIONS”, Journal of Tax Administration, 2, 2, 24-46.
ABSTRACT: The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralized context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralized tax administration, as in the medium-long run the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved.
Working Papers:
Salvadori, L. (2015): “DOES TAX ENFORCEMENT COUNTERACT THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TERRORISM? A CASE STUDY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY”, Working Papers of the IEB 2015/09.
This paper was awarded the Epainos Prize for Young Regional Scientist at the ERSA 2015 Congress. Media coverage: [1] & [2].
ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the impact of terrorism on tax enforcement policies by focusing on the case of the Basque Country. The presence of externalities in tax administration attributable to the costs of terrorism is investigated by undertaking a theoretical analysis. The findings of this are tested using Spanish data extracted from repeated surveys and other sources. By employing ordered response models, evidence is found of the negative impact of terrorism on tax enforcement as it is perceived by residents in the Basque Country and Navarre. In particular, this impact is found to be stronger for entrepreneurs and liberal professionals. No significant impact is found for individuals resident in the rest of Spain.
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